ndcppv2_1_changes

Notable NDcPPv2.1 Changes (from v2.0e)

Lachlan Turner Certifications, Common Criteria

NDcPPv2.1 is hot off the presses from the Network iTC.  It is yet to be officially accepted by NIAP for PCL usage however this is probably not too far off, perhaps with some minor tweaks (the new NTP SFR being something to watch).

Here are some notes from our initial review:

  • NTP. A new SFR has been added for NTP which we understand refers to mechanisms that are supported by commonly available NTP clients.  Vendors still have the option of specifying manual time configuration. If v2.1 is accepted by NIAP as is, this will remove the mandated use of a trusted channel for NTP which was causing problems for some vendors in v2.0e.
  • TLS. Administrators can now elect to ignore certificate validation failures. Support for 192-bit ciphersuites has been removed and a couple of new suites have been added.
  • X.509. Certificate revocation checking requirements have been ‘clarified’ by an application note. This may result in changes for implementations that meet the current requirements.
  • Audit Events. All generation/import/change of long-term cryptographic keys (i.e. not session keys) need to be audited, including those that are automatically generated by the TOE.

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SSH Rekey Limits with OpenSSH

Greg McLearn Common Criteria

Background

In the current version of the NDcPP there is a cryptographic Security Functional Requirement (SFR) called FCS_SSH*_EXT.1.8.  On the face of it, FCS_SSH*_EXT.1.8 is a fairly straightforward SFR with a relatively straightforward means to enforce it:

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8: The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and no more than one gigabyte of transmitted data. After either of the thresholds are reached a rekey needs to be performed.

However, it is vitally important to read the application note (Application Note 102 in NDcPP v2.0+20180314) that follows this SFR element, because one small detail appears to be catching vendors by surprise:

For the maximum transmitted data threshold, the total incoming and outgoing data needs to be counted.
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6 Tips to Help Avoid Surprises In Your Next Common Criteria Evaluation

Jason Lawlor Certifications, Common Criteria

Undertaking a Common Criteria (CC) evaluation should not be an opaque process from a timing, process or cost perspective. In this post, the testing experts at Lightship provide 6 practical tips to ensure that you are getting the best value and outcomes for your certification dollar. The following is targeted primarily at Protection Profile (PP) based evaluations, but most also apply to Security Target (EAL) based projects.

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lightship-iaea-cyber-risk-nuclear-supply-chain

Lightship at IAEA Meeting on Cyber Risk in the Nuclear Supply Chain

Lachlan Turner Common Criteria, Lightship News

Lightship Security Director of Consulting, Lachlan Turner, was nominated by the Government of Canada to participate in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Technical Meeting on Reducing Cyber Risks in the Supply Chain which was held at IAEA’s Headquarters in Vienna, Austria, from 25 to 29 June 2018. Lachlan attended along with some 110 other delegates from around the world. Delegates included nuclear regulators, operators, suppliers and various other industry representatives.Read More

Don’t Call it a Bash Script: Automation is Not Scripting

Alex Thurston Certifications, Common Criteria

Or, maybe it is.  In reality, the answer is that all automation is scripting but not all scripting is automation.  Automation is really a maturation or evolution of scripting.  Calculators script the mathematical principles defined by Thales, Pythagoras, Euclid and Archimedes.  To-do applications script the act of making a list of tasks on a piece of paper and scratching them off.  The directions given by Google Maps on a road trip script the job normally performed by the person with a paper map sitting in the passenger seat.

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Secure Tunnelled NTP Proof of Concept

Greg McLearn Common Criteria

Update 2018-Oct-03: This post has been updated within new information from NDcPP v2.1.

Recently, NIAP issued Technical Decision TD0321: Protection of NTP communications.  It states that network time sources are critical pieces of information that must be protected.  However, having no other agreed-upon mechanism to authenticate the source of, or ensure the integrity of NTP packets, NIAP requires vendors to use NTP over one of only a handful of acceptable trusted communications channels: TLS, DTLS, HTTPS*, SSH or IPSec.

This leaves many vendors in a bind since there are (a) no public-facing NTP servers that operate over any of these permissible channels; and, more importantly, (b) there are no widely available NTP server/client implementations that can be used to build such a solution.

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niap-td0321-protection-of-ntp-communications

NIAP TD0321: Protection of NTP communications

Lachlan Turner Certifications, Common Criteria

Update 2018-Oct-03: This post has been updated within new information from NDcPP v2.1.

NIAP has issued Technical Decision TD0321 against the Network Device Collaborative Protection Profile (NDcPPv2.0e) mandating the use of a trusted channel (IPsec, SSH, TLS, DTLS, HTTPS) for NTP (or non-NTP external entity used to set time).  This will impact any in-flight and future NDcPP evaluations that are destined for the NIAP PCL.
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